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Abstract
Despite challenges and doomsday predictions, the Nordic welfare states with high 
taxes and public expenditure are still with us. This paper describes strategic choices for 
policy makers of the welfare state and uses the case of Sweden to argue that the high tax 
welfare state has survived several challenges through a process of incremental change, 
where the welfare state is modified in order to maintain political support from voters who 
would otherwise favor cutbacks. This gradual adaptation leads to heterogeneous univer-
sality characterized by flexibility, freedom of choice, and financial solutions that involve 
both public and private funding. While such policies may increase inequality, they play a 
crucial role in maintaining political support for high taxes and expenditures. Compared 
to likely counterfactual scenarios, this gradual adaptation may be the political strategy 
that minimizes inequality in the long run.
Keywords: Welfare state, Nordic model, institutional change, taxation
1 Introduction
Over the latest two decades, social scientists have identified a number of challenges 
for big welfare states. Perhaps the most commonly mentioned factor is the increased mo-
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bility of labor and capital, possibly leading to states competing for production factors by 
lowering both taxes and benefits in a race to the bottom. Recently, however, empirical 
research has discovered a remarkable resilience in the big welfare states. For example, fi-
gure 1 below shows total taxes as a share of GDP for the three countries with the highest 
and the lowest total taxes in the EU in 1995. What we see looks very little like a race to 
the bottom. If anything, this decade of economic integration may have produced some 
small degree of convergence towards the EU-average: the average standard deviation was 
4.6 for the years 1995-2000 and 4.3 for the years 2001-2005.
Figure 1   Taxes (percent of GDP) in high tax and low tax EU countries
Source: Eurostat
The conclusion that the big welfare states did indeed survive the crisis of the 90s, 
appears in several detailed case studies as well, see for example Bergh (2004b), Castles 
(2004), Bergqvist and Lindbom (2003), Lindbom (2001), Timonen (2001), Kvist (1999) 
and Kautto (1999).1 These findings stand in contrast to doomsday stories like Snower 
(1993), and to the once frequent demise of the Swedish welfare model in publications 
such as the Wall Street Journal and The Economist.2 For this reason, we must ask if the 
doomsday predictions for big welfare states were wrong, exaggerated or if the welfare 
state has found ways to adapt to changing circumstances.
1 Blomqvist (2004) however points out that many important changes in Sweden during the 90s were qualitative 
rather than quantitative, and as we shall see these qualitative changes have been crucial for understanding the quan-
titative persistence of high tax societies.
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The answer given in this paper, is that while there have been some exaggerations con-
cerning the impact of globalization on the welfare state, the main reason for the persisten-
ce of high tax welfare states is that the strategy chosen by policy makers involves gradu-
ally adapting the welfare state to new circumstances. In the words of Streeck and Thelen 
(2005), we are dealing with incremental change with transformative results. This paper 
contributes to our understanding of welfare state resilience by showing that a simple eco-
nomic assumption takes us very far in understanding the type and direction of these in-
cremental changes: in order to survive in a democracy, the welfare state needs to be sup-
ported by a majority of the population. When external forces put the welfare state under 
pressure, policy makers have responded with measures that maintain welfare state support 
among voters who are otherwise likely to favor large cutbacks and lower taxes.
If the forces that drive welfare state change continue to be incremental rather than 
abrupt, the framework presented in this paper can actually be used to predict the type of 
changes that will take place in the Nordic welfare states the coming decades. The crucial 
assumption is that politicians respond to external forces by incrementally modifying cu-
rrent welfare state institutions in order to maintain political support. Empirical evidence, 
mainly from Sweden but also from the other Nordic welfare states, clearly indicates that 
this strategy has indeed already been seemingly successfully implemented. If the strate-
gy is maintained, high tax welfare states will continue to exist in the future, but they will 
become more heterogeneous and flexible.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss some challenges and 
changes that the Nordic welfare states must adapt to. In section three I present a simple 
framework for analyzing political support for welfare states and the strategic choices po-
licy-makers are facing. In section four I describe the gradual adaptation process in prac-
tice using examples mainly from Sweden. Section five discusses the distributional con-
sequences of this adaptation, and section six concludes.
2 Four challenges for the welfare state
Before analyzing how the welfare can adapt to changing circumstances, let us review 
what these changing circumstances are. The literature offers several accounts of challen-
ges facing big welfare states. For example, Snower (1993) argues that universal welfare 
states will come under budgetary pressure and therefore welfare services should be redi-
rected from the middle class to the poor. Further, and less drastic, examples can be found 
in Lindert (2004) and Steinmo (2003). Analyzing all potential future challenges for the 
welfare state is not possible. In this paper, I focus on the following four challenges:
•   Increased mobility of tax bases makes it more difficult to collect the taxes needed 
to finance the welfare state.
•   An ageing population means that people may need support from the welfare state 
for a longer period towards the end of their life.
•   Increased efficiency of private insurance markets means that the market alternative 
to the welfare state will be more competitive.236
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•   Technology-driven increased expectations from publicly financed private consump-
tion, especially in the health care sector, mean that citizens will demand more from 
the welfare state. 
Granted, focusing on these four factors excludes many important challenges. For 
example, Lazar and Stoyko (1998) mention changed family structure, high fiscal deficits, 
incentive problems with generous benefits and changed political ideology. Still, the first 
two factors are probably the most frequently mentioned among the challenges for the wel-
fare state, and the second two factors are included because they are likely to be important 
in the future. Let us now briefly discuss these four challenges. How severe are they?
Regarding the mobility of tax bases, capital is already more or less completely mobile 
between countries, whereas labor mobility in Europe is still very low. This is important, 
because labor mobility plays an important role in Sinn’s (1997) theory of systems com-
petition, which describes how countries compete for high-quality labor. In practice, labor 
mobility is not high enough to induce a race to the bottom as described by Sinn (2004), 
but there are signs that mobility is increasing. Pedersen et al. (2003) report that there was 
a marked increase in emigration from Sweden during the 90s, especially among the hi-
ghly educated.
The ageing population is another challenge for the welfare state. The old-age depen-
dency ratio in the EU (defined as the population aged 65 and above relative to the popu-
lation aged 15 to 64) is projected to double between 2000 and 2040 (Disney, 2003). This 
development seems drastic indeed, and it has led to a debate in which the most extreme 
position is that the welfare state will collapse under the demographic pressure.
Increasing longevity does not necessarily mean that people need to be supported from 
the welfare state for a bigger part of the lifecycle. There are competing hypotheses re-
garding the so-called healthy life expectancy. The theory by Fries (1980) of compressed 
morbidity is the most optimistic, whereas Gruenberg (1977) suggests a more pessimistic 
scenario of morbidity expansion. Most likely, there are mechanisms working in both di-
rections. For example, Karlsson et al. (2005) report that healthy life expectancy in the UK 
increased by around 1.5 years between 1981 and 2001, whereas overall life expectancy 
increased by 2.1 years for women and 3 years for men.
The increased efficiency of private insurance markets affects the political support for 
social insurance schemes. Hindriks and De Donder (2003) show that if private insuran-
ce companies can observe individual risks, and thus are able to avoid the adverse selecti-
on problem, the political support for social insurance will decrease. While it is less reali-
stic to assume that private insurance firms can freely access individual risk information, 
it can be shown that the lower the cost of obtaining such information, the lower is the po-
litical sustainability of social insurance (see Bergh 2003; 2004). The increased efficien-
cy of private insurance markets means that the market alternative to social insurance will 
become more attractive for those who know that their risk of becoming sick, disabled or 
experiencing a work related injury is less than the average risk.
Finally, the rapid development of modern medical technology means that it will be 
difficult publicly to provide health care at a quality level sufficient for everybody. In a 
recent Swedish survey, Rosén and Karlberg (2002) found that 59% of citizens and only 237
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12% of physicians agreed fully with the statement that the public health services should 
always offer the best possible care, irrespectively of cost.3 Increased expectations are cau-
sed not only by improved technology but also by increasing incomes. According to Fogel 
(1999), the long run income elasticity for health care services is 1.6. Thus, as we grow 
richer, we want to spend a bigger part of our budget on health care. For this reason, the 
universal level provided by the welfare state will be perceived as insufficient for an in-
creasing number of high income earners.
Summing up, the four challenges do not pose a sudden and disastrous threat to the wel-
fare state – they have been developing for some time now. However, they cannot be expe-
lled as myths, and it seems likely that they will continue to grow stronger in the future.
3 Modeling welfare state support
Understanding welfare state support is a complex issue. Three possible explanations 
are self-interest, reciprocal support and altruism. The self-interest approach can be traced 
back to at least Meltzer and Richard (1978), who note that those who are net-gainers from 
welfare state redistribution are likely to vote in favor of the welfare state. While the self-
interested approach is analytically convenient, the issue is much more complex than me-
rely calculating if a person is a net-gainer or a net-receiver in monetary terms.
At the opposite explanatory extreme, we find altruistic support, where even net-payers 
to the welfare state vote in favor because they are altruistic towards those who gain from 
redistribution. Little is known for sure about the origin and nature of human altruism.4 
It is fair to say, however, that reciprocal welfare state support is the most accepted 
explanation today – see for example Bowles and Gintis (2000) and Mau (2004). Accor-
ding to this hypothesis, people are willing to contribute to the welfare state – provided that 
there is a relation between efforts and rewards that is perceived to be just. The willingne-
ss to contribute is contingent on the assumption that there will be adequate future returns 
(Mau, 2004). One way of putting it is to state that people willingly support the welfare 
state, provided that others do so as well. People do not wish to be contributing but never 
receiving anything in return, and in this sense reciprocal welfare state support is not fun-
damentally different from self-interested welfare state support.
Supporting both the self-interested and the reciprocal explanations, there is substan-
tial empirical evidence that big welfare states survive because they are beneficial for the 
broad middleclass – see for example Goodin and Le Grand (1987), Rothstein (1998) and 
Korpi and Palme (1998). Furthermore, there is also evidence that the historical expansi-
on of the welfare state can largely be explained by political factors based on voters’ self-
interest (see Lindert, 2004).
For these reasons, the analysis in this paper will rely on a more sophisticated version 
of the simple self-interest model in combination with reciprocity. Figure 2 below shows a 
3 Similar “expensive expectations” may exist in other publicly financed areas, such as schooling.
4 This is, however, currently a very lively research field, see for example Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) and 
Ostrom and Walker (2003).238
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simplified model of a universal welfare state suggested among others by Rothstein (1998).5  
The idea is that approximately proportional taxes are used to finance benefits (both cash 
and in-kind), and that people are eligible for these benefits regardless of their income. 
With some extensions, this model will be used to analyze how welfare state support is af-
fected by the four challenges mentioned in the previous section.
Because the welfare state redistributes both among individuals and over the life cycle 
of each individual, Figure 2 must be viewed in a lifetime perspective. Over the life cycle, 
ex post, some people will end up as net-payers and others as net-gainers. But ex-ante, 
this cannot be known! For this reason, there is an insurance motive for redistribution that 
must be taken into account. If people are risk-averse and worry about future income lo-
sses, even some who eventually end up as net-payers will support the welfare state, be-
cause of the safety it provides.
Figure 2 A simplified model of the universal welfare state
In addition to the insurance motive for redistribution, a model for welfare state sup-
port should also consider the perceived counterfactual scenario, the in-kind effect and the 
level effect – explained in the following.
Peoples’ support for the welfare state depends on what they perceive to be the relevant 
counterfactual scenario. More important than being a net-gainer or a net-payer is whether 
people perceive that they are better off under current welfare state institutions than they 
would be under the most likely alternative scenario, probably a combination of market and 
family based solutions. For example, people who are net payers to social insurance sys-
5 The universal welfare state is perhaps more well-known as the social democratic welfare state in the frame-







A. Bergh: Explaining the Survival of the Swedish Welfare State: Maintaining Political Support Through 
Incremental Change
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) 233-254 (2008)
tems may well be better off under social insurance compared to market solutions, if mar-
ket insurance to some degree is characterized by imperfect competition or adverse selec-
tion problems – see for example Sinn (1995), Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000) and 
Hindriks and De Donder (2003). But if the alternative to the welfare state is improved for 
some groups, the welfare state support in these groups will be undermined because they 
now feel that they would be better off under alternative arrangements. 
The in-kind effect refers to the fact that receiving public consumption worth a cer-
tain amount is not equivalent to receiving the same amount in cash. For this reason, some 
groups may feel that the services they are entitled to are not what they would have cho-
sen to consume had they been given cash transfers instead. When the difference between 
citizen’s preferences and what the welfare state provides is bigger, the less likely is the 
citizen to support the welfare state.6
Finally, the level effect is closely related to the in-kind effect: Assuming that the ser-
vices provided by the welfare state are exactly what citizens would buy anyway, there may 
still be a negative effect on welfare state support if the level spent is lower than the desired 
spending level. For example, in the absence of a welfare state, both low and high-income 
earners would likely spend some money on primary education. But low-income earners 
would spend less and high-income earners more than the equal amount provided by the 
welfare state. Thus, high-income earners may feel that the consumption level provided by 
the welfare state is insufficient, with negative consequences for welfare state support.
3.1 Political strategies: status quo, system shift or gradual adaptation?
The challenges to the welfare state mean that policy makers are faced with a strate-
gic choice. Two extreme strategies can immediately be identified. One is to do nothing 
in order to maintain the status quo. The other is fundamentally to restructure the welfare 
state, a system shift. Between these extremes we find various types of incremental chan-
ge, including a gradual adaptation of the welfare state to new circumstances. These stra-
tegies are described in Table 1.
Obviously, the distinction between gradual adaptation and a system shift is a matter 
of degree rather than one of kind, as pointed out by Hinrichs and Kangas (2003). Never-
theless, the incremental change of gradual adaptation can potentially explain the absence 
of a system shift in the Nordic welfare states. Small, strategic changes in tax- and bene-
fit systems alter the welfare state in response to changes in its environment, so that voters 
who would otherwise favor radical changes with substantial cut-backs continue to sup-
port the welfare state.
The system shift is unlikely to be successful: we know from the literature on institu-
tional change in welfare states that such radical changes typically only occur under extra-
ordinary circumstances in an abrupt process of change.7
6 Theoretically, the in-kind effect on political support could be positive. For example, if people know that they 
have myopic preferences and are unable to save privately for their ageing despite wanting to do so, the welfare state 
may serve as a desired commitment device. 
7 See for example Streeck and Thelen (2005), Pierson (2001) and Stephens, Huber and Ray (1999).240
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The political strategy of the status quo will appear the most egalitarian and most con-
venient in the short run. However, if external forces continue to grow stronger, this stra-
tegy may jeopardize political support for the welfare state in the long run. There are a 
number of case studies in the literature suggesting that countries trying to preserve the 
status quo for too long may run into problems, which subsequently lead to big institutio-
nal changes (see for example Lo Vuolo (1997) on the case of Argentina, and McClintock 
(1998) on the case of New Zealand).
The Nordic welfare states have clearly chosen the strategy of gradual adaptation. In the 
next section, I describe in more detail the way that several incremental changes have con-
tributed to maintaining political support in Sweden and the other Nordic welfare states.
4 Maintaining political support for big welfare states through gradual adaptation
In short, the gradual adaptation of the Nordic welfare state has involved the following 
policy measures:
· changes in the tax structure
· increased work incentives
· accepting private topping up of public benefits.
·   use of vouchers to combine freedom of choice, private provision and public fun-
ding.
This section provides empirical examples and describes how these measures affect 
welfare state support. While there are of course some parts of the welfare state where li-
ttle has happened, the examples listed below concern the biggest transfer (the pensions 
system), publicly financed consumption and the tax-system, demonstrating that the chan-
ges taking place are more than marginal
Table 1   How the policy makers of the welfare state can respond to changing 
circumstances – three strategies.
Political strategy Description
Maintain status quo Ignore challenges and changing circumstances. Aim to keep tra-
ditional welfare state institutions intact.
System shift Use changing circumstances and challenges as arguments for 
a fundamental restructuring of the welfare state, such as abo-
lishing universality in favor of a basic or a targeted welfare sy-
stem.
Gradual adaptation   Modify the welfare state in response to changing circumstan-
ces, resulting in maintained welfare state support while avo-
iding self-interest turning supporters into voters that demand 
large cut-backs.
Source: Author241
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4.1 Changing tax-structure
Big welfare states can tackle the problems caused by increased tax-mobility in dif-
ferent ways: 
• accept lower revenue and run deficits.
• accept lower revenue and decrease expenditure.
•   counteract increased mobility by offering compensating benefits to the production 
factors that would otherwise move.
•   compensate the tax loss by increasing taxes on less mobile production factors.
Obviously, the first option is not economically feasible in the long run. As already 
noted, the second option is problematic for political reasons. This leaves options 3 and 4, 
both of which call for changes in the tax system. This is exactly how the Nordic welfare 
states have adapted so far.
To maintain high tax revenue when some tax bases are becoming more mobile, a big-
ger share of taxes must be shifted to relatively less mobile factors. Boadway (2005) argues 
that the system that best combines the objectives of a good tax system in an internation-
ally competitive environment is the dual income tax system used in the Nordic countries 
where capital is taxed at a low, flat-rate and non-capital income is taxed progressively. 
Lindert (2004) points out that the Swedish tax level is substantially higher than for exam-
ple US-taxes on all areas except capital taxes.
This argument can be taken further: When it comes to labor taxation, the Nordic wel-
fare states have higher average taxes, but compared to the US and the UK, they collect a 
relatively bigger share of taxes from low and middle-income earners, and a smaller rela-
tive share from high-income earners – see Table 2. 
Table 2   Proportion of taxes paid by the lowest (30%), the middle (40 %) and the 
highest (30%) of the population (based on final disposable adjusted income).
Low (30%) Mid (40%) High (30%)
United States   6 28 65
United Kingdom   6 32 62
Finland 10 33 57
Norway 10 36 54
Sweden 11 36 53
Denmark 14 37 49
Source: Förster (2000)
Recently, welfare states have adapted by abandoning highly progressive tax sched-
ules, but they have not lowered the level of total taxes. In the early 1990s, both Sweden 
and Norway conducted reforms that reduced tax-distortions by lowering the statutory tax 
rates and broadening the tax bases – see for example Agell, Englund, and Södersten (1996) 
and Aarbu and Thoresen (1997). Lazar and Stoyko (1998) show that the number of tax 242
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brackets and the top marginal tax rates have decreased markedly between 1975 and 1990 
in almost all modern welfare states.
In addition to fundamental structural measures like changing the overall progressiv-
ity of taxes some problems caused by increased mobility can also be tackled by specific 
exceptions for specific groups. Sweden, Denmark and Finland have all introduced excep-
tions in the income taxation, according to which for example foreign experts are liable to 
substantially lower marginal income tax-rates. In Sweden, 25 percent of the gross wage is 
exempt from taxation for a period of maximum three years. Denmark goes even further: 
the highest marginal tax rate is roughly 60 percent, but foreign researchers staying for a 
maximum of three years pay only a proportional tax at 25 percent.8 For further details re-
garding selective exceptions in income taxation, see ITPS (2005). Thus, welfare states have 
adapted by making the tax burden less of a burden on groups with higher mobility.
At this point, it deserves noting that it is wrong to ignore tax-financed benefits when 
analyzing the sustainability of high tax systems – as stressed by for example Steinmo 
(2003). The problem is that many of the benefits financed by the welfare state have pub-
lic-good properties, leading to the classic free-rider problem: those who avoid paying high 
taxes may still be able to enjoy the benefits financed with taxes from others.
As it turns out, welfare states can handle the free-rider problem by tying benefits 
closely to individual labor market participation. For example, the biggest social transfer, 
the pension system, is typically designed specifically to avoid this problem. In Sweden, 
income related pension rights are earned-only for incomes in Sweden, and a full flat rate 
pension is granted only to citizens who resided in Sweden for at least 40 years between 
the age of 16 and 64.
Many potential problems related to so-called strategic welfare migration still remain 
though. If people enjoy publicly financed education until the age of 25, work abroad for 
most of their adult life, and move back to take advantage of publicly financed care for 
elderly, this will cause problems for the welfare state. Similarly, there have been worries 
that increased immigration from poorer European countries will put the Nordic welfare 
states under pressure.
So far, however, empirical research does not indicate that strategic welfare migra-
tion is a big problem, even among states in the US. Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2003) 
conclude that “the poor do not migrate in large numbers for more generous welfare as-
sistance.” (p. 329) and also that “the magnetic effect of welfare is substantially weaker 
than the magnetic effect of high wages for low-skill workers and a low unemployment 
rate” (p. 344). In other words, labor migration is about people seeking work opportuni-
ties in richer countries, and not so much about strategically seeking the benefits of gen-
erous welfare states.9
8 Before abandoning the wealth tax in 2007, Sweden also had a similar exception in the wealth tax for those who 
own at least 25 percent of the shares in a company, if these were bought before 1990.
9 Tentatively, both of these findings are confirmed in a Swedish context. The most recent study by the Swedish 
National Social Insurance Board found that the EU-expansion taking in 10 new and substantially poorer countries 
only marginally affected expenditure on family benefits (see Försäkringskassan (2005) and http://www.eubusiness.
com/East_Europe/040825093559.y65bxren). However, the fact that for example Latvian construction workers now 243
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To sum up: big welfare states can maintain high tax revenue by shifting the tax bur-
den towards less mobile tax bases, decreasing tax-progressivity, introducing compensating 
exceptions to highly sensitive production factors and by making it harder to free ride by 
enjoying tax financed benefits without paying the taxes that finance them. Many changes 
in this direction have already taken place in the Nordic welfare states.
4.2 Increasing work incentives
When the share of the lifecycle spent working falls because people leave school later, 
retire earlier and live longer, welfare states are faced with the choice between decreasing 
benefits and raising taxes. To alleviate the problem, policymakers are typically advised 
to increase work incentives (see for example OECD, 2005).
Increased work incentives can be achieved in different ways. In the long run, welfare 
states can encourage people to work longer before retiring. In the short run, reforms can 
increase incentives to work longer hours per day and more days per year. The Nordic wel-
fare states are currently struggling with both types of reform, and not without success.
Increasing the age at which people retire can be achieved either through rules or in-
centives. The latter is the option best suited for maintained welfare state support as it lets 
each individual trade off leisure against consumption according to their own preferences. 
Disney (2003) reports that pension reforms in this direction have already been undertaken 
in many countries. In particular, the Swedish reform undertaken in 1998 means that pensi-
on benefits are adjusted actuarially to the (within limits) freely chosen retirement age, re-
sulting in strong economic incentives to defer retirement until later in life. Pension reforms 
aiming at increasing the retirement age have also been undertaken in high tax countries 
like for example Belgium and Finland. Norway has been slower in this area, but in May 
2005 the Norwegian parliament agreed on a reform including among other things a bene-
fit adjustment factor to account for changes in life expectancies at age of retirement.
Sweden and to a slightly lesser extent  Denmark and Finland still have substantial pro-
blems caused by weak work incentives in the short run. The combination of high taxes on 
labor, generous unemployment benefits and income-tested benefits creates high marginal 
effective tax rates – see Lindbeck (1994). Since Sweden drastically lowered tax progre-
ssivity in the early 90s, work disincentives now typically appear for low-income earners, 
mainly due to the means tested nature of social assistance – see Bergh (2004b).
To sum up: By reforming pension systems, many welfare states have begun to han-
dle problems caused by low work incentives in the long run. Reforms aiming to increa-
se short-run work incentives are currently at the heart of the political debate in the wel-
fare states.
4.3 Topping up
As already noted, health care services are normal goods with income elasticity high-
er than one. This means that as the population in a welfare state grows richer, the demand 
can compete for work in Sweden, has triggered some spectacular conflicts on the Swedish labor market (see  http://
www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2005/01/feature/lv0501101f.html ).244
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for these services will increase, and more so among those who are relatively richer. Thus 
the difference in the absolute spending level desired by high-income earners and low-in-
come earners will increase over time. 
Maintaining the current level of benefits per capita when the ratio of old to adults in-
creases requires higher taxes. Therefore, it will be very difficult to publicly finance an 
even higher level demanded by high income owners universally for the whole population. 
Thus, politicians must make a choice between allowing citizens to top up public funds 
with private money, or having citizens paying twice in order to attain the level of servic-
es they prefer: once by paying taxes, and once again to a private provider when topping 
up is not allowed.
A fundamental insight gained from  our analysis is that political support for the wel-
fare state is bigger when topping up is allowed compared to when people must pay twice. 
Theoretically, we expect welfare state support to decrease among those who feel that pay-
ing twice is the best way to attain desirable level and quality. This has also been verified 
empirically by Hall and Preston (1998) who showed that people who opt out from public-
ly provided health care and pay for private health insurance support less spending on the 
public system. This is one reason why the status quo strategy may work only in the short 
run: as more people prefer to pay twice, public welfare state support is jeopardized.
When topping up is allowed, those who desire to do so can increase the service level 
by adding private money on top of the public funding. This means that a smaller share of 
the taxes paid by the upper middle class is redirected to consumption by other groups.10
Topping up can not only  complement publicly provided services, it can also com-
plement monetary social insurance transfers of the Bismarckian type where incomes are 
replaced proportionally. In this case, topping up means increasing the effective replace-
ment rate from the publicly provided level towards full insurance. Topping up alleviates 
the negative level-effect on welfare state support for the following reason. Mandatory so-
cial insurance with replacement rates close to 100 percent means that people who have 
low demand for insurance (because they have low risk aversion or low risk for income 
losses) are forced to consume more income protection than they otherwise would. If the 
mandatory replacement rate is lowered, people may complement protection up to the de-
sired level, either individually through market insurance or group-wise through occupa-
tionally negotiated insurance schemes. Ståhlberg (2003) shows that the latter solution is 
indeed already well established: occupational contracts cover almost the entire working 
population, and as expected the details and conditions vary between groups.
Because they are mandatory, social insurance schemes can avoid costs of advertise-
ment and also the costs associated with identifying risk groups. Empirically, it has also 
been shown that social insurance typically has lower administration costs than private in-
surance – see for example Gouyette and Pestieau (1999). For this reason, it may well be 
the case that the most preferred alternative for many voters is the combination of social 
insurance and private topping up, and this alternative may be strictly preferred to a sys-
tem based only on market insurance, as well as to a system based only on social insur-
10 Recently, public policy documents show that the Nordic welfare states are indeed facing exactly the strategic 
choice described here – see for example the Swedish Långtidsutredningen 2003/04, SOU2004:19.245
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ance. In fact, Bergh (2003) shows that topping up contracts can induce high income earn-
ers to support social insurance in situations when they would otherwise favor pure mar-
ket insurance over social insurance without topping up.
Summing up, it has been shown that, perhaps contrary to popular belief, allowing 
for topping up of both public consumption and social insurance will in many situations 
increase political support for the welfare state. Furthermore, topping up is already very 
common in the Nordic welfare states.
4.4 Vouchers, private providers and profits
Using vouchers is a way of maintaining public financing while giving the citizens of 
the welfare state bigger influence over the service provided. Blomqvist (2004) describes 
the so called “choice revolution” in the provision of public welfare services in Sweden, 
which in addition to vouchers also contained the use of quasi markets such as purchaser/
provider arrangements.
An increased use of vouchers can be seen as a way to dampen the negative effects 
on welfare-state-support caused by the in-kind effect, by giving people more freedom to 
choose what services to consume. Note that the opportunity to choose more freely may 
be appreciated and used only by a small part of the population – but if these are the vot-
ers who would otherwise stop supporting the welfare state, the use of vouchers may well 
be the policy that marginally secures majority support.
Indeed, the standard result from studies of voucher systems in practice is that the free-
dom to choose is used initially by very few, but that this share is constantly growing over 
time – see for example Edebalk and Svensson (2005). Also, for education, child care and 
health care, user satisfaction is higher among those who have chosen private providers 
compared to those who have chosen public providers.11
The pattern that private providers initially play only a small role, but that their share 
is slowly growing, is confirmed by Blomqvist (2004), relying mainly on data from a pub-
lic expert commission report (Socialdepartementet, 2002):12
•   the share of privately employed health-care staff increased from 5 to 7 percent 
between 1993 and 2000
•   the share of privately employed workers in the elderly care sector grew from 2 to 
13 percent between 1993 and 2000
•   the share of children in publicly funded private day care facilities grew from 5 to 
15 percent between 1990 and 1999
•   by 2002, ten years after the introduction of school vouchers, the share of students 
attending publicly financed private schools had grown from 0 to 5 percent for pri-
mary schools and 6 percent for secondary schools.
11 For elderly care, the difference is insignificant – see www.kvalitetsindex.se, used by the Swedish government 
in Långtidsutredningen 2003/04.
12 Again, these trends are not limited to Sweden. For example, Edebalk and Svensson (2005) analyze customer-
choice for elderly people and persons with functional disabilities, recently implemented in all of the Nordic countries. 
In some Swedish municipalities the process started as early as  the early 1990s, but currently Denmark, with a nation-
ally regulated customer-choice system since 2003, is the most progressive of the Nordic countries.246
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Furthermore, the share of private providers is typically higher in urban areas and 
in high-income municipalities. Also, parents with high income and high education are 
more likely to use the possibility of sending their children to a privately provided school 
(Blomqvist and Rothstein, 2000). Importantly, this shows that the increased freedom of 
choice is used more by citizens whose welfare state support is negatively affected by the 
in-kind effect and the level effect described in section 3. Also, as reported above, the 
highly educated constitute  an increasingly mobile group of tax-payers. This leads to the 
conclusion that vouchers and similar reforms change the way the welfare state has tradi-
tionally been organized, but at the same time they alleviate some problems related to tax 
mobility and political support.
The market orientation has at least two additional effects. Even if voucher systems 
keep the public financing of welfare services, their introduction changes the political power 
structure in several ways: Blomqvist notes that further privatization may be accelerated 
by the dynamics set in motion by consumer choice, and that private provision of welfare 
services may lead to increased pressure for private financing as well. This argument is not 
new. In fact, an old article in the the Cato Journal describes exactly such an incremental 
strategy for social security privatization – see Butler and Germanis (1983).
However, some mechanisms point to the opposite conclusion. Vouchers and quasi 
markets may actually lead to increasing support for publicly provided welfare services. 
Competition and organizational experimentation speeds up the learning process, so that 
efficient ways of producing welfare services are spread more rapidly. Theoretically there 
should be positive effects of competition not only for private providers, but also in pub-
lic units who have incentives to increase quality in order not to lose funding because peo-
ple choose private providers instead. Studying the Swedish school voucher reform, Sand-
strom and Bergstrom (2005) found empirical support for this hypothesis, and conclude 
that competition has a positive effect on school results in public schools.
Thus, market reforms such as vouchers and quasi-markets may affect the power 
structure and lead the way towards further privatizations, but to some extent this effect is 
counterbalanced by the fact that market reforms impose strong efficiency incentives for 
the whole public sector, which may dampen discontent with high taxes in marginally im-
portant groups of voters.
4.5 Result: Constant support for the welfare state
According to surveys, the support for public welfare expenditure in Sweden has been 
constantly high and possibly increasing during the period from 1981 to 2002 (Svallfors, 
2004). As expected, these surveys clearly show that socio-economic groups with higher 
incomes report lower welfare state support.
More interestingly, welfare state support is constant or increasing over time for each 
socio-economic group. If no changes were made to the welfare state, we would expect 
the four challenges to induce decreasing support for the welfare state among high income 
earners. Instead, as result of gradual adaptation, high income earners, highly educated and 
relatively more mobile groups have benefited from several reforms, resulting in main-
tained political support for the welfare state.247
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The table below summarizes the challenges and the responses according to the strat-
egy of gradual adaptation.
Table 3 Policy responses to welfare state challenges according to gradual adaptation
Challenges Policy responses
Increased mobility of tax bases decreases possi-
bilities for a majority to extract large amount of 
tax revenue from a minority without a substanti-
al negative effect on the tax base.
Increased reliance on less mobile tax bases. De-
creasing tax-progressivity.
Selective compensation measures.
Tying benefits closer to taxes.
Ageing population requires higher taxes and/or 
lower benefits per capita
Pension reforms increasing work incentives. 
Increased use of private topping up in care for 
elderly.
Increased efficiency of private insurance markets 
means that the market alternative to social insu-
rance will become more attractive for those with 
risks below average.
Topping up of social insurance. Decreasing 
vertical income redistribution in social insu-
rance schemes.
Increased expectations on publicly financed cre-
ate a demand for private solutions, where people 
who pay twice support lower public spending.
Introducing freedom of choice through vou-
chers. Increased efficiency through competiti-
on. Allowing, simplifying or encouraging top-
ping up of public consumption.
Source: Author
5 Distributional consequences
Clearly, the gradual adaptation of the universal welfare state implies a slightly lower 
degree of redistribution. But if the gradual adaptation strategy means that fundamental 
welfare state universality is maintained, the outcome is probably more egalitarian than 
the counterfactual situation that would arise if universality were replaced with a basic or 
a targeted welfare system.
The main reason for this is that the strategy of gradual adaptation keeps the most im-
portant redistributive mechanisms of the universal welfare state intact. For example, as 
pointed out by Rothstein (1998), the combination of proportional taxation and flat rate 
benefits creates a substantial amount of redistribution even in the absence of tax progre-
ssivity. Thus, fewer tax-brackets and lower marginal top rates do not necessarily indicate 
lower redistribution.13 The redistribution of the welfare state depends on both progressi-
vity and size of the welfare state (Åberg, 1989), and gradual adaptation trades off progre-
ssivity in order to maintain political support for a big welfare state.
Recent research also points to public expenditure on education as an important re-
distributive mechanism of the welfare state. While this effect does not show up when re-
13 It should also be noted that a formally progressive tax schedule may be less progressive in practice, if there are 
deductions and exceptions which can be used by tax planning – see Agell, Englund, and Södersten (1996).248
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distribution is described using the standard approach of comparing Gini coefficients for 
gross and net income distributions, Sylwester (2002) showed that countries with higher 
education expenditure in the 1960s experienced lower inequality ceteris paribus 20 to 30 
years later, and Meghir and Palme (2005) show that primary school reform in Sweden in 
the 1940s had a big negative effect on subsequent income inequality. When topping up 
is allowed, the upper middle class has an interest in maintaining a high quality of public 
schools: the higher the quality provided by the public level, the less will be spent on top-
ping up by those who want to pay for even higher standards.
Another important mechanism for redistribution in the Nordic welfare states is the 
Bismarckian social insurance systems, where income losses are replaced proportionally. 
These systems create redistribution when income and risk are negatively correlated, which 
is typically the case for short term income losses such as illness. An illustration of this is 
given in Figure 3, which shows that sick leave in Norway is lower in occupations with 
higher salaries. For this reason, upper benefit limits have a relatively small redistributi-
ve effect, as indicated in figure 2b. Here, benefits and contributions to the Swedish sic-
kness benefit system are described using data from the National Social Insurance board, 
with and without the upper limit.14 As we can see, the net redistribution goes from high 
to middle-income earners, regardless of the upper benefit-limit.
Finally, topping up in itself have some interesting distributional consequences. When 
citizens are not happy with the level or quality of publicly provided welfare services, there 
are many ways to compensate. Even without monetary topping up, parents can for exam-
ple participate in public child care and help on a voluntary basis in primary schools. In 
health care and care for elderly, the reliance on voluntary contributions is typically big-
ger. Thus, when monetary topping up is not allowed, people compensate through unpaid 
voluntary work.
When analyzing the distributional impact of allowing topping up, one must take into 
account people’s varying capacities to complement welfare services with unpaid work. 
Allowing monetary topping up is beneficial for high income earners because the opportu-
nity cost of their time is higher. On the other hand, monetary topping up is also relative-
ly more important for people with lower degree of work flexibility, i.e. who find it more 
difficult to take the afternoon off in order to help out at school.
Thus, policy makers in the welfare states are faced with a difficult choice. Many of the 
policy measures that seem necessary to retain support for the welfare state in the long run 
are likely to lead to increased inequality in the short run. But a status quo strategy trying 
to preserve the old welfare state institutions may in the long run induce political support 
for a very different type of welfare state. For this reason the strategy of gradual adaptation 
is likely to be the preferred choice also among egalitarian policy makers.
6 Concluding Discussion
The four challenges analyzed in this paper have not led to the death of the Nordic 
welfare state – but they have led to a number of important changes.
14 Calculations are static, i.e. they do not include potential behavioral effects of removing the benefit limit.249
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Figure 3 Redistribution in Bismarckian social insurance
Source: Statistics Norway. Thanks to Geir Ivar Andreassen for assistance in providing data.
 Source: Calculations based on RFV (1995, 1996). Assumptions: The replacement rate is 80 per-
cent for all incomes below 7.5 basic amounts (approximately 275 kkr). The insurance is financially bal-
anced by a mandatory fee at four percent paid on all incomes below the upper benefit limit. This is an 
approximate description of Swedish sickness benefit in the 1990s.
Figure 3a Redistribution in Bismarckian social insurance
•   Labor is still immobile in Europe – but higher mobility seems to put a limit on tax 
progressivity.
•   The populations are ageing – but at least some of the years gained are healthy years, 
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•   Private insurance markets are gaining ground in many areas – but politicians can 
respond with actuarial reforms, decreasing the amount of vertical income redistri-
bution and allowing topping up.
•   Finally, expensive expectations for publicly financed private consumption such as 
health care, schooling, child care and elderly care is handled by allowing (and so-
metimes even relying on) a mixture of public financing and private efforts in terms 
of both money and unpaid work.
Historically, the strategy of ensuring that the middle class supports the welfare state 
fits very well with the strategy used by the social democrats when the welfare state was 
under construction. Berman (1998:382) notes that the social democrats at the turn of the 
century were careful to address not only the proletariat or manual workers but instead ad-
dressed “Sweden’s working people” or “all progressive citizens in the city and the coun-
try”. Later, Svensson (1994) shows how the welfare program of the 60s was designed to 
fit the needs of white collar workers, indicating that social democrats were now address-
ing ‘wage-earners’ rather than ‘workers’. 
In the well-known framework of Esping-Andersen (1990), the Nordic welfare states 
are described as social democratic. Other authors have used other labels, such as encom-
passing, institutional or universal, but as shown in Bergh (2004b), these various labels all 
refer to roughly the same thing: the welfare state as it looks  in the Nordic countries. A 
consequence of the gradual adaptation described in this paper, is that these welfare states 
are changing, and becoming more heterogeneous. Sure, the Nordic model as it existed 
in the year 1980 was arguably dead only 20 years later. On the other hand, the ability to 
change and adapt is also the ability to survive. Oppenheim (1997) summarizes the devel-
opment eloquently:
”Finally, universal welfare state services are the cornerstone of the post-World War 
welfare settlement. Universalism remains important. […] However, welfare policies have 
to create unities of interest between the majority and the poor within a context of sharp-
ening inequalities. Thus, it is not the universalism of the 1940s, but one which allows for 
diversity and combines universal membership and individual autonomy. It would open 
up the possibility of different contributions for different benefits and the tailoring of ser-
vices for a variety of needs. Above all it promotes inclusion over and above strict equal-
ity in order to retain broad public support.”
As has been shown, the changes made so far seem to have been sufficient to maintain 
political support for the Swedish welfare state, and represent a good candidate for explain-
ing the persistence of a welfare model many times predicted to collapse. Whether similar 
changes are sufficient also for future challenges only time will tell.
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